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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

SALVADOR TORRES-GARCIA,

:

Case No. 20040815-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

:

APPELLANT IS INCARCERATED

INTRODUCTION
First, this Court should reverse because the trial court erred by denying TorresGarcia's motion to continue after the State failed to give notice of its expert, as required
by Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (2003). Second, this Court should reverse because the
trial court abused its discretion by admitting the drug and weapon evidence in violation of
rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Third, this Court should reverse because the
cumulative effect of the errors undermines confidence that Torres-Garcia had a fair trial.
ARGUMENT
I

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED BY DENYING TORRES-GARCIA'S MOTION TO
CONTINUE AFTER THE STATE FAILED TO GIVE NOTICE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 77-17-13

This Court should reverse the trial court's decision to admit Watson's expert
testimony without granting Torres-Garcia a continuance because the trial court: (A) erred

by holding section 77-17-13(6) applied, and (B) abused its discretion by denying TorresGarcia's request for a continuance when the State failed to provide notice of Watson's
expert testimony under section 77-17-13(1) and the lack of notice prejudiced TorresGarcia's case.
A.

The Trial Court Erred By Concluding Section 77-17-13(6) Applied.
First, the meaning of subsection six's phrase "reasonable notice through general

discovery," has not yet been determined by Utah's appellate courts, but can be discerned
from "read[ing] the plain language of the statute as a whole." State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Sundance Development Corp., 2003 UT App 367,% 78 P.3d 995. Section 77-1713 was enacted to ensure defendants receive enough time and information "to adequately
prepare to meet adverse expert testimony." State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998). Subsection six was not added to section 77-17-13 to exempt the State
from providing notice of its State-employed expert witnesses. Rep. K. Bryson, sponsor,
speaking on floor of Utah House of Representatives, H.B. 238, 55th Leg., Day 40,
February 28, 2003 (Tape 2, Counter 0839) (explaining that by enacting subsection six,
Utah Legislature intended to excuse State from subsection one's formal notice
requirements only where "general discovery provided by the state gives notice that the
expert may by used"). Instead, it was added to excuse the State from complying with
subsection one's formal notice requirements if the State has already put the defendant "on
reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert may be called as a witness at
trial." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(6). Thus, reasonable notice through general
discovery under subsection six, like formal notice under subsection one, is notice that
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gives the defendant enough time and information "to adequately prepare to meet" the
adverse expert testimony. Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1170.
Specifically, subsection six might not require the State to formally list the expert's
name, address, qualifications, and substance of testimony, as subsection one does. See
Aple. Br. at 13-14. It does, however, require the State to ensure similar information is
included in its general discovery. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(6); Arellano, 964 P.2d
at 1170. Moreover, by requiring such information to be disclosed during general
discovery, subsection six ensures the defendant will receive the information early in the
case, just as he would have under subsection one. See Utah R. Crim. P. 16(b) (requiring
State to provide general discovery "as soon as practicable following the filing of charges
and before the defendant is required to plead"). To hold otherwise, would contradict the
purpose of section 77-17-13 and leave defendants without the notice necessary to
adequately prepare to meet State-employed expert witnesses. See State v. Tolano, 2001
UT App 37,1J12, 19 P.3d 400 (explaining notice under section 77-17-13 gives defendant
opportunity to examine testing procedures, hire own expert, examine resumes, and
possibly impugn qualifications); Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1170.
In this case, the State did not provide reasonable notice through general discovery
of its intent to call Watson as an expert witness. The State did not provide Watson's
name or notice of Watson's expert testimony in any of the information it gave TorresGarcia during general discovery. R. 256:11. Instead, it attempted but failed to comply
with the formal notice requirements of subsection one. R. 60-62. Accordingly, TorresGarcia did not receive any notice of Watson's testimony until five days before trial when

3

the State mentioned Watson's name on a witness list and in a motion hearing. R. 255:45, 16; 256:9-10. Further, he did not know he needed to prepare to meet Watson's
testimony until the first day of trial when the trial court, based on the State's motion to
reconsider under subsection six, changed its previous ruling and permitted the State to
call Watson without a continuance. R. 256:14-16. As recognized by the trial court,
notice provided the day of trial, or even five days before trial, is not sufficient notice to
satisfy the formal notice requirements of subsection one because it does not allow the
defendant enough time to adequately prepare to meet the expert testimony. See State v.
Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 528-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding trial court erred by denying
continuance where notice was given first day of trial and allowed defendant two evenings
to prepare, because defendant was forced to find "expert hastily," "did not even have time
to conduct additional testing," and was prevented "from formulating a trial strategy best
calculated to address the totality of the State's case"). For similar reasons, such short
notice of expert testimony does not satisfy the reasonable notice through general
discovery requirement of subsection six. See id.
Second, determining whether the State complied with section 77-17-13 requires
the trial court to make two rulings: (1) whether the state "substantially complied]" with
the statute and whether a continuance is necessary to "prevent substantial prejudice," and
(2) whether the State's "failure to comply" was "the result of bad faith." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-17-13(4). In this case, the trial court's statement that the State had "submitted
notice of the expert testimony . . . in a timely fashion," R. 255:14, was not a finding that
the State had substantially complied with the statute and a continuance was not necessary
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to prevent substantial prejudice. See Aple. Br. at 15. Instead, it was a ruling that the
State's failure to comply with the statute was not the result of bad faith. R. 255:14. In
whole, the trial court said:
I do agree with Mr. Mack's assessment that there is not bad
faith in this. In fact, the State has in fact submitted notice of
the expert testimony, it was done in a timely fashion, there
were no specific reports to attach so that they could not
comply with that and they have stated a statement of what
Mr. Watson's testimony would be and that he would be called
to testify concerning drug trafficking.
Id. The trial court then went on to rule a continuance was necessary because TorresGarcia did not receive notice of Watson's testimony until the motion hearing held five
days before trial and that notice did not provide Torres-Garcia sufficient time and
information to allow him to "counter [Watson's] expert testimony, whether that's through
testimony of [his] own witnesses . . ., or a scientific reliability argument." Id at 16. The
trial court only later changed its ruling that a continuance was necessary because it
misinterpreted subsection six's reasonable notice requirement. R. 256:14-16. Thus,
because the trial court did not make a finding that the State had substantially complied
with subsection one's formal notice requirements, Torres-Garcia was not required to
challenge such a finding or marshal the evidence in support of such a finding. See State
v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60,T|60, 28 P.3d 1278 (holding duty to marshal attaches when
defendant is seeking to "demonstrate that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous"); R.
255:14-16; Aple. Br. at 15, 17.
Third, Torres-Garcia did not argue below and does not argue now that the State's
failure to comply with subsection one's formal notice requirements was the result of bad
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faith. R. 255:4-5, 10-11; Aplt. Br. at 20-33. Thus, his statements below that he believed
the State did not act in bad faith in failing to comply with subsection one's notice
requirements are not concessions of his argument or invited error. Aple. Br. at 16; State
v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3,^25, 63 P.3d 110 ("Invited error may exist when
'defendant's counsel consciously chose not to object and "affirmatively led the trial court
to believe that there was nothing wrong with the instruction."5" (citations omitted)).
Instead, Torres-Garcia argued below and continues to argue now that he "didn't
receive any notice" of Watson's potential testimony until five days before trial when
Watson's "name was mentioned in conjunction with [his] motion in limine" and he could
not "prepare to meet this expert or consider obtaining [his] own expert to counter their
expert when . . . the requirements of. .. 77-17-13(l)(b)[] have n o t . . . been completely
followed." R. 255:4-5; 256:11. Thus, Torres-Garcia's argument is properly preserved
for appeal because he gave the trial court "an opportunity to address a claimed error and,
if appropriate, correct it," and he did not "forego making an objection with the strategy of
enhancing] [his] chances of acquittal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1fll, 10 P.3d 346
(quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original); see Hart v. Salt Lake County
Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding issue is properly preserved if
"'"it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the
issue'"" (citations omitted)); Aple. Br. at 15-16.
The only support for Torres-Garcia's argument that was not specifically discussed
and ruled on below was the fact that the certificate of delivery attached to the State's
notice of expert testimony says notice was not served on Torres-Garcia, but on another
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attorney not representing Torres-Garcia. R. 60-62. The certificate of delivery, however,
is not a separate argument that required separate preservation. Cf State v. Valenzuela,
2001 UT App 332,^25 n. 4, 37 P.3d 260 (addressing identity issue even though not
specifically preserved because defendant preserved probable cause issue and identity
included in probable cause issue). Indeed, such preservation would have been difficult
since the problem on appeal is that Torres-Garcia never received the notice or
accompanying certificate of delivery. R. 255:4-5, 16; 256:9-11. Instead, the faulty
certificate of delivery, which is located in the record before this Court, simply provides
further support for defense counsel's argument below that the State did not provide notice
of its expert testimony and the trial court's original ruling that a continuance was
necessary. Id; R. 60-62.!
B.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Torres-Garcia's Request
For a Contmuance Under Subsection One.
Torres-Garcia was substantially prejudiced when the trial court abused its

discretion by denying him a continuance. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4)(a); Aplt. Br. at
31-33. First, as explained above, the trial court never found that the State complied with
subsection one by successfully serving notice of Watson's expert testimony on TorresGarcia. See supra at Part LA; R. 255:16. Instead, the trial court held a continuance was
necessary because Torres-Garcia did not receive notice of Watson's expert testimony

1

As explained above, the faulty certificate of delivery is merely support for
Torres-Garcia's argument that a continuance was necessary because the State did not
provide notice of its expert testimony. If this Court disagrees, however, it should still
reverse because, as argued in Torres-Garcia's opening brief, the trial court's error was
plain. See Aplt. Br. at 29 n.l.
7

until the motion hearing held five days before trial and that notice did not provide TorresGarcia sufficient time and information to allow him to "counter [Watson's] expert
testimony, whether that's through testimony of [his] own witnesses . . . , or a scientific
reliability argument." R. 255:14-16. This holding is substantiated by Torres-Garcia's
counsel's repeated statements that he had not received the State's notice of expert
testimony and the fact that the certificate of delivery indicates the notice of expert
testimony was not sent to Torres-Garcia's counsel. R. 60-62; 255:4-5; 256:9-11. Thus,
Torres-Garcia's inability to prepare to meet Watson's expert testimony was the result of
the State's failure to provide notice of its expert testimony in time for Torres-Garcia to
adequately prepare to meet the expert testimony. See Tolano, 2001 UT App 37 at %\3;
Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530; Aple. Br. at 21.
Second, the State's mention of Watson's name and general description of his
expertise five days before trial did not provide Torres-Garcia sufficient time and
information to allow him to adequately prepare to meet the expert testimony. R. 254:2728; see Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1171 (holding notice of expert testimony provided "five
days before trial" did not allow defendant enough time to "prepare to challenge [State
expert's] testimony on cross-examination," "consult with his own expert," and
"incorporate any new information into the defense strategy"); Aple. Br. at 21-22. This is
especially true in this case because the trial court originally ruled a continuance was
necessary and the State agreed not to call Watson to testify. R. 255:16. Thus, TorresGarcia did not know he needed to prepare to meet Watson's testimony until the first day
of trial, when the trial court changed its ruling based on its misinterpretation of
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subsection six's notice requirements. R. 256:14-16; Begishe, 937 P.2d at 528, 532
(reversing where State gave notice of expert but did not give notice of new test expert
would testify about until first day of trial); State v. Harshman, 658 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Or.
Ct. App. 1983) (holding "effective administration of justice requires that discoverable
evidence be provided much sooner than 'moments' before trial").
Third, "testimony of an expert at a preliminary hearing . . . constitutes notice of
the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the expert's proposed trial
testimony as to the subject matter testified to by the expert at the preliminary hearing."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(5)(a). For this subsection to apply, however, notice of the
expert testimony must be witness specific. See State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App
226,1|30, 95 P.3d 1193 (holding section 77-17-13 "clearly contemplates that the opposing
party will have the opportunity to prepare for that expert's testimony in a witness-specific
fashion"), cert, granted, 106 P.3d 743 (Utah 2004). In this case, the State did not call any
expert witness at the preliminary hearing, let alone Watson, and did not make any
reference to Watson's possible testimony. R. 253. Thus, the preliminary hearing did not
put Torres-Garcia on notice that he should prepare to meet Watson's expert testimony.
See Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226 at ^[31 (holding, in case where State called different
witnesses at preliminary hearing and trial to offer expert testimony, State "deprived
[defendant] of the notice that he would need to prepare a witness-specific response to that
testimony"); Aple. Br. at 22.
Fourth, expert testimony is testimony about "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge" and must be provided by "a witness qualified as an expert by
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knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." Utah R. Evid. 702. Because expert
testimony is composed of specialized knowledge, the Legislature enacted section 77-1713 to ensure that defendants have enough information and time "to adequately prepare to
meet adverse expert testimony." Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1170. Adequate preparation
includes preparing to "challenge" expert testimony, planning "for effective crossexamination," consulting "with [the defendant's] own expert," obtaining "rebuttal
testimony," and, most important, incorporating "any new information into the defense
strategy." IdL at 1169 n.2, 1171 (citations omitted). In this case, the State never
challenged Watson's designation as an expert witness. In fact, the State itself categorized
Watson as an expert by filing notice of Watson's expert testimony. R. 60-62. When he
finally learned of Watson's testimony, Torres-Garcia stated that he needed time to learn
what Watson's testimony would entail, consider "the necessity of having a Rimmasch
hearing," and "consult an expert of [his] own in some sort of rebuttal." R. 255:15-16.
The trial court, before changing its ruling based on its misinterpretation of subsection
six's notice requirements, agreed that Torres-Garcia needed a continuance to allow him
time to "counter" Watson's expert testimony, "whether that's through testimony of their
own witnesses . . ., or a scientific reliability argument." R. 255:16. The State did not
object to Torres-Garcia's stated need for a continuance or the trial court's finding that
Torres-Garcia needed time to prepare to meet Watson's expert testimony and to
incorporate Watson's testimony into his defense strategy. IcL Thus, the State cannot now
argue on appeal that Torres-Garcia did not need time to prepare to meet Watson's
testimony. See State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,^9, 76 P.3d 1159 (holding appellate court
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may affirm based on alternative ground only if the alternative ground is apparent on the
record and supported by the trial court's factual findings); Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT
58,^20, 52 P.3d 1158 (same); Aple. Br. at 22-23.
Fifth, as explained in his opening brief, the trial court's order denying a
continuance substantially prejudiced Torres-Garcia because it prevented him '"from
formulating a trial strategy best calculated to address the totality of the State's case.'"
Aplt. Br. at 31-33 (quoting Begishe, 937 P.2d at 531). In Begishe, the State failed to
disclose part of its expert testimony. Begishe, 937 P.2d at 528. On appeal, this Court
reversed because the State's failure to disclose the expert testimony led defense counsel
to "believe that the prosecution had no physical evidence corroborating the allegations"
and to pursue "tactics and strategies with this assumption in mind." Id. at 531.
Specifically, defense counsel emphasized in her opening statement "that the State had no
inculpatory physical evidence." Id Then, because the expert was permitted to testify,
defense counsel had to use her closing argument "to counter the physical evidence" and
"argue[] alternative reasons for blood appearing." Id. "It is likely defense counsel's
credibility in the eyes of the jury was greatly compromised by the prosecution's having
introduced evidence of the blood test after she assured them the State had no physical
evidence supporting the charge." IcL
Similarly, in this case, Torres-Garcia's counsel said during opening statements that
he intended to discredit Irwin's identification by demonstrating the discrepancies in her
testimony. R. 256:147-50. He then elicited these discrepancies through crossexamination and recorded them on a chart he displayed before the jury. R. 256:176-214;
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258:250-61, 300-92, 407-425. Following Torres-Garcia's extensive cross-examination of
the State's witnesses, Watson took the stand and resolved several of the discrepancies
Torres-Garcia had highlighted in Irwin's testimony. R. 258:436-40. Whether Watson
resolved every discrepancy is beside the point. See Aple. Br. at 22-23. The fact that an
expert repeatedly dismissed the discrepancies that Torres-Garcia's counsel had called
attention to and relied upon throughout trial, "greatly compromised" defense counsel's
"credibility in the eyes of the jury." Begishe, 937 P.2d at 531; see Aplt. Br. at 31-33.
Specifically, Torres-Garcia highlighted Irwin's conflicting statements that
Delgado-Cruz usually drove the gold Nissan and the shooter drove the gold Nissan after
the shooting, but Delgado-Cruz was not the shooter. R. 256:176-214; 258:250-61, 30092, 407-425. Torres-Garcia used these statements to suggest Irwin's identification was
not reliable and Delgado-Cruz was in fact the shooter. R. 256:147-50 (defense counsel
telling jury to pay careful attention to testimony about "different people going to different
cars and a very important description of who left in which vehicle"); Aple. Br. at 23.
Watson, however, resolved Irwin's contradictory statements, thereby discrediting TorresGarcia's counsel in the eyes of the jury, by testifying drug dealers keep multiple cars and
runners do not always use the same car. R. 258:436-40. Similarly, Torres-Garcia
highlighted Irwin's inconsistent statements about whether Todd asked for money or drugs
in exchange for the heroin, and her use of different names to identify the shooter. R.
256:176-214; 258:250-61, 300-92, 407-25. Again, Watson resolved these statements and
discredited Torres-Garcia's counsel by testifying drug users use "monetary amounts to
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represent the amount of drug they want," and drug dealers use nicknames and change
their nicknames "[e]very time they answer the phone." R. 258:436-40.
Thus, a continuance was necessary to allow Torres-Garcia to interview Watson
about his expert testimony, examine Watson's testimony for scientific reliability and
Watson for expert qualifications, prepare an effective cross-examination, consult other
experts, obtain rebuttal testimony and, most important, incorporate what he learned into
his defense strategy. R. 255:14-16; 258:434-40. This, at the very least, would have
allowed Torres-Garcia to alter his trial strategy so as to avoid having his defense directly
attacked by the State's expert. Begishe, 937 P.2d at 531.
II

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING THE DRUG AND
WEAPON EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF RULE 404(b) OF THE
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

First, the drug and weapon evidence was not offered for a proper, noncharacter
purpose and was not relevant as required by rule 402. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b); Aplt.
Br. at 34-38. As admitted by the State, the "only element at issue before the jury was the
identity of Todd's killer." Aple. Br. at 29 (emphasis in original). This is because the
shooter's motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and absence of
mistake or accident were clear—Todd would not return the drugs so the shooter shot
Todd to retrieve the drugs. R. 259:488-49, 500-24; Aplt. Br. at 36. Further, as admitted
by the State, the prosecutor offered the drug and weapon evidence to show Torres-Garcia
was "a drug dealer, like the shooter," and "was willing to enforce his trade through
violence, like the shooter." Aple. Br. at 27-28. Using the drug and weapon evidence to
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characterize Torres-Garcia as a dangerous drug dealer, however, did not help the jury
identify his as the shooter. Aplt. Br. at 36-37. Nor did it increase the probability that
Torres-Garcia was the shooter. Id. at 39-41. The drug and weapon evidence did not
place Torres-Garcia at the scene of the crime, demonstrate a pattern of behavior that
tended to link Torres-Garcia to the crime, or distinguish Torres-Garcia from any other
possible shooter as the likely perpetrator. Id Instead, it singled out Torres-Garcia as a
drug dealer who shoots people who interfere with his business, thereby allowing the jury
to infer his guilt in this case. Id
Second, the drug and weapon evidence did not meet the requirements of rule 403.
The first factor to consider when deciding whether evidence is admissible under rule 403
is "'the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime.'" State v.
Allen, 2005 UT 11,1(24, 108 P.3d 730 (citation omitted). Under this factor, it does not
matter whether the other crime evidence is "strongly indicative" of the State's theory of
the present case. Aple. Br. at 31. The question is whether the evidence is "strong" that
the defendant "in fact" committed the other crime. Allen, 2005 UT 11 at 1J30. In this
case, as explained in Torres-Garcia's opening brief, the strength of the evidence as to the
commission of the other crime was weak because Torres-Garcia had not yet been
convicted of possessing the drug and weapon evidence and had a defense that the
prosecutor could not prove constructive possession. R. 254:8-15; Aplt. Br. at 39.
The second factor to consider when deciding whether evidence is admissible under
rule 403 is "'the similarities between the crimes.'" Allen, 2005 UT 11 at ^[24 (citation
omitted). This factor is not met by alleging the charged crime was "motivated by" the
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other crime. Aple. Br. at 32. Motivation is a factor to be considered when deciding
whether other crime evidence was relevant and was offered for a proper, noncharacter
purpose. See Utah R. Evid. 402, 404(b). Instead, this factor is met if the charged crime
and the other crime share "significant and striking similarities." State v. NelsonWaggoner, 2000 UT 59,^29, 6 P.3d 1120; see Aplt. Br. at 39 (citing additional cases).
Thus, this factor was not met in this case because, as admitted by the State, "the crimes of
murder and drug distribution are not similar." Aple. Br. at 32; see Aplt. Br. at 39-40.
Third, the State's need for the other crime evidence was low and the efficacy of
alternative proof was high. As discussed in Torres-Garcia's opening brief, this case is not
like State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 993 P.2d 837. Aplt. Br. at 40; but see Aple. Br. at 32.
In Decorso, the "other crimes evidence . . . was vital to the State's case" because the
defendant murdered the only witness and the only other evidence was a fingerprint.
Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at ^33. Whereas, in this case, the other crime evidence was not
vital to the State's case because the State had Irwin's testimony identifying Torres-Garcia
as the shooter and Delgado-Cruz's corroborating testimony. In fact, the other crime
evidence was not even helpful to the State's case, except to impermissibly establish bad
character, because the only issue at trial was identification and the drug and weapon
evidence did not help establish identity. See supra at Part II; Aplt. Br. at 34-37, 40.
Fourth, the drug and weapon evidence suggested Torres-Garcia had a greater
"proclivity for violence" or a more "'significant criminal character'" than the charged
crime. State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,^59, 37 P.3d 1073 (citation omitted); Aplt. Br. at 4041 (listing additional citations). The State admits it offered the drug and weapon
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evidence to show Torres-Garcia was "a drug dealer" who "was willing to enforce his
trade through violence." Aple. Br. at 27-28. Thus, although the drug and weapon
evidence did not help the jury to identify Torres-Garcia as the shooter in the charged
case, it allowed the jury to infer Torres-Garcia's guilt in this case because he was a drug
dealer who collected weapons for the specific purpose of committing crimes like the
charged crime. See Aplt. Br. at 34-37, 40-41. Accordingly, the drug and weapon
evidence likely roused the jury to overmastering hostility by allowing it to conclude
Torres-Garcia, even if he was not the shooter in this case, was deserving of prison
because he collected weapons and used these weapons to kill people who interfered with
his drug business. R. 259:487, 527-28, 538.
Fifth, the interval of time between the charged crime and the other crime in this
case was six weeks. R. 258:291. This fact, however, is meaningless where the other rule
403 factors are not met. See State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238,^35-37, 32 P.3d 976
(ignoring time factor where other rule 403 factors, especially similarity factor, were not
met); Aplt. Br. at 38-41; supra at Part II.
Ill

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE CUMULATIVE
EFFECT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS UNDERMINES
CONFIDENCE THAT TORRES-GARCIA HAD A FAIR TRIAL

The State's brief does not address Torres-Garcia's argument that this Court should
reverse because the cumulative effect of the trial court's errors undermines confidence
that Torres-Garcia had a fair trial. See Aple. Br. at 12-34. Thus, for the reasons stated in
Torres-Garcia's opening brief, this Court should reverse Torres-Garcia's conviction
under the cumulative-error doctrine. See Aplt. Br. at 47-49.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Torres-Garcia5s conviction because the trial court
abused its discretion by denying Torres-Garcia's motion for a continuance and by
admitting the drug and weapon evidence.
SUBMITTED this a ^

day of September, 2005.

J£^_

LORTJrSI
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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